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Abstract  One of the famous neuroscientific studies on economic decision makings on the 
American Economics Review is Zak et al. (2005), which reported that male (but not female) 
players who received high distrust signals from opponent players showed higher 
dehydro-testosterone levels. We measured testosterone levels in this study since 
dehydro-testosterone is produced from testosterone by the enzyme 5-Į reductase. Using female 
college students, we found that (1) there was no relation between distrust signals and the 
receivers’ testosterone levels, as was reported in Zak et al. (2) female players with higher 
testosterone levels had lower values in the beauty contest game, i.e., they were more conscious 
about others’ strategies, (3) there was positive but not significant relation between testosterone 
levels and risk aversion, which is contrary to our initial prediction. 
Keywords: testosterone, trust-game, beauty-contest, risk-aversion, 
1. Introduction
Many researchers from different academic areas are trying to understand the 
mechanism by which various kinds of hormones and neurotransmitters affect human 
decision making. Since hormones mediate the coordination of the whole body, they 
are considered to influence on many social behaviors.  
In this study, we have focused on the relationship between testosterone and 
economic decision-making, using only female subjects. We performed three kinds of 
experiments. The first involved the distrust-game, or trust game, which we will 
explain later in detail. We investigated whether subjects experienced a change in 
their testosterone level when they received a distrust signal. Zak, et al., reported that 
dehydro-testosterone (DHT) levels of male subjects, but not female subjects, 
increased after they received distrust signals. Testosterone levels also did not change 
significantly. We tried to replicate the study but with testosterone, which is a 
precursor of DHT.  
Our second type of experiment involved the so-called beauty contest game. In this 
game, subjects are asked to choose one number between 1 and 100, to indicate a 
number as close as possible to the one that is obtained by multiplying the average of 
the numbers chosen by all the players by 0.7. For example, suppose that all subjects 
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first choose an arbitrary numbers and the average is 50. In this case, the right answer 
is 35. If all subjects are rational enough to predict the choices of all participants, 
then the right number becomes about 25 after the second iteration, and with 
successive iteration it eventually reaches 1.  We had predicted that higher the 
subject’s testosterone level, more aggressive they would be in this sort of 
competitive situation, and accordingly, those with higher testosterone level would 
answer smaller numbers.  
In order to outperform other subjects, the player needs to think about the 
multiplication operation on the average of all chosen numbers, which leads to 
smaller number being the right answer. In some context, this game measures how 
rational an agent is. In our experiment, however, we used this game to measure the 
competitive attitudes of subjects with higher or lower testosterone levels.  
The third type of experiment concerned the relationship between the level of 
testosterone and the degree of risk-aversion. The latter was obtained by asking the 
subject’s preference between a probabilistic (ordinary) lot and a certainty lot, the 
expected values of which were the same. Then, subjects were asked the certainty 
equivalence of the first lot. The questions we used were taken from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979).  
Our prediction for this experiment was a negative correlation between the level of 
testosterone and the degree of risk-aversion, i.e., higher the testosterone level, the 
less risk-averse the person would be. The reasoning behind this prediction was 
simply that, since testosterone is regarded to cause aggressive behavior particularly 
in men, a higher testosterone level should make the individual more risk-taking, or 
risk-loving. This is in accord with the widely known observation that men are more 
risk-loving than women.  
Let us examine the topics addressed by these three experiments in turn. 
1. Testosterone and distrust signals
The trust game is as follows (Berg et al. 1995; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001): 
there are two decision makers, DM1, and DM2, who do not know each other 
throughout the game. DM1 is given $10 at the beginning of the game, who then 
sends some proportion out of this $10 to DM2. To make it concrete, let us suppose 
that DM1 sends $5 to DM2 and retains $5. DM2 receives the amount sent by DM1 
multiplied by three, which amounts to $15 in this case. Of this amount, DM2 decides 
how much money to send back to DM1. Let us suppose that DM2 sends back $4 to 
DM1.  
Accordingly, DM1 finishes the game with the sum of the retained money in the 
first stage plus the amount that DM2 sends back to DM1. In our example, DM1 gets 
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$5 plus $4 = $9 and DM2 gets $11.  
This game is called the trust game, or the distrust game, because if DM1 were to 
trust DM2 and send DM2 the whole $10, this would maximize the sums of money 
received by both DM1 and DM2, but this in turn gives a chance for DM2 to retain 
the whole amount of money received and DM1 would finish the game with no 
money at all. This situation can be seen as complete betrayal. However, if DM2 is 
fair enough, he/she may send back an amount such that both DM1 and DM2 end up 
with the same amount. When this is the case, DM1 can trust DM2 completely and 
send the whole $10. DM2 in turn, would send back half of the whole $30 and two 
players each finish with $15.  
On the other hand, DM1 may retain the whole $10 and send nothing to DM2. This 
decision will leave DM1 with $10 for sure but no possibility finishing with more 
than $10. In this case, DM1 sends no money and a signal of complete distrust to 
DM2.
Using this experimental scheme, Zak et al. found that when DM2 received a 
relatively small amount of money, a higher DHT level was observed in case of male 
subjects but not female. DHT is produced from the testosterone by the enzyme 5-Į
reductase and the former is estimated to be roughly 3-fold more potent than the latter. 
Therefore, the results of Zak et al. imply that, men tend to become more aggressive 
when they are distrusted.  
We tried to replicate this observation using female subjects. With measurement of 
their testosterone levels, we expected to find a significant change in DM2’s 
hormonal level confronting distrust signals. The initial endowment for DM1 $10 was 
1000 yen, which was about 10% less than $10 (about $1 = 110 yen on the date of the 
experiment June 13 2008). To further follow Zak et al. (2005), we divided DM2s 
into three groups. One of these was the control group who received a randomly 
assigned amount from 0 to 3000 yen which did not reflect DM1’s decision at all and 
this situation was made known to both DM1 and DM2 before the experiment. The 
other two-thirds of the whole group constituted the experimental group; this group 
was divided according to the amount of money sent by DM1 into, they are divided to 
a trusted group, members of which received equal to or more than 1500 yen, and the 
distrusted group, members of which received less than 1500 yen.  
We took a saliva specimen before the experiment and a second specimen shortly 
after DM2s were informed of the amount of money their corresponding DM1s would 
pass to them. As described above, our focus was on the change in testosterone level 
after DM2s received the trust or distrust information.  
The results were not clearly in any particular direction. The mean testosterone 
levels were in the order: distrusted group < trusted group < controlled group. When 
we compared the trusted and distrusted groups, we observed a very weak positive 
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correlation, i.e., the more trust was shown in a person, the more testosterone was 
secreted by them. Using the two-sample one-tailed t-test assuming identical variance, 
the t-statistic for the relation was -0.5147 with a p-value of 0.3069. Since the 
number of experiments we performed was 17, it may be the case that there were too 
few samples to produce any significant statistics.  
Comparing the control and the trusted groups, the difference was now statistically 
significant in that the controlled group secreted more testosterone than the distrusted 
group. Using the two-sample one-tailed t-test assuming identical variance, the 
t-statistic was -1.8806 with a p-value of 0.04049. We obtained similar results using 
the Welch two-sample t-test. The number of observations in this case was 15. We 
also predicted that DM1s with a high testosterone level would tend to distrust others 
and send a smaller amount of money. However we found no significant relationship 
in accord with this conjecture.  
We do not have a good explanation for these results. In particular we have no 
satisfactory explanation for the high testosterone level being found in the controlled 
group. Therefore, we conclude that there is not a clear relation between distrust 
signals and the level of testosterone secretion. Our results may be related to the 
small sample size of the experiment, or may indicate the nonexistence of the 
relationship in case of women. 
2. Testosterone and the beauty-contest game 
As is widely known, John Maynard Keynes pointed out the resemblance of the 
beauty-contest game to the psychology of the market. In this game settings, the 
correct predictor of the winner of the contest becomes the winner of the game. 
Players of the game have to consider not only their own opinion who is most 
beautiful, but also others’ preferences. Therefore, the winner is rather the person 
who best predicts other players’ actions after taking their predicted preferences into 
consideration.  
A typical game of this kind proceeds as follows: each player chooses one number 
between 1 and 100. The winner of the game is the player, who picks the number 
closest to the value obtained by multiplying the average picked by all players by 0.7. 
The only logical answer should be 1, since the average of the numbers (A) is 
multiplied by 0.7, and 0.7A therefore becomes the right answer. If all players fully 
understand this, all of them will think that the other players will reduce their initial 
choice of numbers by the factor 0.7. This process continues until all players reach 
the conclusion that the right answer of the game should always be 1 regardless of the 
initial preferences, at least logically.  
However, this is not the case, as is easily predicted by most people except game 
	



theorists. Actual players do not think so deeply the first time they play the game, or 
at least they do not correctly think that all other players behave in this extremely 
logical manner. Therefore the real problem is how many times they should multiply 
the initially conjectured average A=50 by 0.7. Typically, many players chose the 
number 35 in this setting, which implies that they do the multiplication only once. 
Another typical, but less popular number is 25, which is obtained by 50 times 0.7 
squared. It has also been reported that the more times a subject takes part in this 
experiment, the right answer becomes smaller (Nagel 1995; Stahl 1996)).  
In our experiment, we focused on the influence of testosterone level on the 
number predicted by the participants. Our simple guess was that, the higher the level 
of testosterone, the smaller the predicted number would be; i.e., a relatively high 
testosterone level would make the player more willing to win in this kind of 
competitive situations.  
Our results seem to support this supposition. We used the beauty-contest game 
twice; the first time the award given to the four best subjects was 1000 yen (about 
$10). From the first experiment, we obtained an insignificant negative relationship 
between the level of testosterone and the number picked by the players. The p-value 
was 0.153 and the adjusted R2 value was 0.0448 for 26 observations. As the subjects 
became accustomed to the rules of the game, we obtained a significant relationship 
from the second experiment, in which the five closest predictors received 600 yen 
(about $6). The p-value was 0.0287 and the adjusted R2 value was 0.139 with 28 
subjects1.
We interpret these results as indicating that testosterone makes an individual more 
eager, and more serious in thinking about others’ predictions and perform more 
number of iterations in order to get the right number to in competitive situations 
such as this.  
Coates and Herbert (2008) reported that testosterone may be an important factor 
in competitive security-traders in the City of London. Together with our findings in 
female subjects, this advantage of a higher testosterone level may apply to any 
extremely competitive markets, such as stock, securities, and foreign exchange 
markets.
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1 To assure that our experiment had a procedural accuracy, we omitted observations 
with the two measured values of the same saliva sample are mutually different for 
more than 25%.
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3. Testosterone and risk-aversion 
Since testosterone makes the male body masculine and makes men more 
aggressive, it is reasonable to expect that an individual with a higher testosterone 
level will be less risk-averse, or more risk-loving than other individuals. This is 
consistent with the observation that men are generally more risk-loving than women.  
First, we asked subjects which lot they preferred: 1. a lot consisting of 80% 
chance to win 4000 yen (about $40), and 20% chance to win 0 yen, or 2. a lot 
winning 3000 yen ($30) for sure. Then, for those subjects who preferred the second 
of these options, we asked, assuming that they could change the amount under the 
second option, how much money is the lower bound to choose the first lot, i.e., we 
asked the certainty equivalence of the first lot.  
Among 47 subjects, 42 chose the second option, and the remaining 5 chose the 
first. We regressed the amount of money they designated as the critical value on 
their levels of testosterone. Our initial guess was that there would be a positive 
correlation between these two values. 
Although we expected a positive and significant correlation, we found a negative 
but non-insignificant relationship. Data of the 47 subjects showed a slightly negative 
relationship with a p-value of 0.5132. Our conclusion from this experiment showed 
that higher testosterone levels do not affect the degree of risk-aversion in women. 
Although this is not in accord with our initial conjecture, it does replicate the results 
of Zak et al. (2005). It is possible that, with regard to risk-taking behaviors, men are 
influenced by testosterone as it might be expected, but this is not the case for 
women.
Apicella et al. (2008) found a positive correlation between men’s testosterone 
level and their degree of risk-loving. It has not yet been established that this kind of 
relationship is not applicable to women, as suggested by the results of the present 
study and those of Zak et al. (2005). 
4. Discussion and further research 
Following Zak et al. (2005), we conjectured that the higher testosterone level 
caused by distrust signals might occur in women as well as in men, but this was not 
the case. This might well show that men and women show different responses to 
various kinds of social signals, including trust. 
With regard to the trust signals and testosterone levels, Burnham (2007) reported 
that men with higher testosterone levels tended to reject unfair offers in the 
ultimatum game. As he suggested, men may think of distrust signals as similar to 
aggression directed at them, which may be why men with higher testosterone levels 
	



reject offers in the ultimatum game and why distrust signals increase male DHT 
levels.
Our results showed that women with relatively high testosterone levels tended to 
choose lower numbers in the beauty-contest game. Perhaps this was because women 
with higher testosterone levels think more seriously about how others think and take 
it into consideration in a competitive situation such as in this game. To test this 
hypotheses, we plan to investigate whether the same is true for men in our next 
experiment.
Although we did not find a significant relationship between testosterone levels 
and risk-aversion, Apicella et al. (2008) reported a negative relationship between 
them in men. Therefore, it is desirable to replicate our experiment with male 
subjects to see if our present results are consistent with those of Apicella et al.
(2008).  
Coates and Herbert (2008) suggest that higher testosterone levels in traders are 
associated with higher profits in the securities market. This is somewhat puzzling to 
academic economists since although a higher testosterone level may well lead to 
riskier transactions, it does not necessarily mean higher profits. The result of Coates 
and Herbert may have been related to a higher risk-premium, or coincidentally their 
experiment may have been performed during a bull period. 
We have just begun to investigate hormonal influences on the economics of 
decision-making. There is a wide variety of knowledge to be further investigated and 
integrated in the future. 
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